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Abstract
Asymmetry in contrarian behavior is investigated within the Galam model of opinion dynamics using update groups
of size 3 with two competing opinions A and B. Denoting x and y the respective proportions of A and B contrarians,
four schemes of implementations are studied. First scheme activates contrarians after each series of updates with
probabilities x and y for agents holding respectively opinion A and B. Second scheme activates contrarians within
the update groups only against global majority with probability x when A is majority and y when B is majority.
Third scheme considers in-group contrarians acting prior to the local majority update against both local majority and
minority opinions. Last scheme activates in-group contrarians prior to the local majority update but only against the
local majority. The main result is the loss of the fifty-fifty attractor produced by symmetric contrarians. Producing
a bit less contrarians on its own side than the other side becomes the key to win a public debate, which in turn can
guarantee an election victory. The associated phase diagram of opinion dynamics is found to exhibit a rich variety of
counterintuitive results.
1. Introduction
The modeling of opinion dynamics is one of the major topic of sociophysics studies [1–11]. Most discrete models
consider the dynamics of two competing choices among identical agents, who all follow the same update rule while
involved in a discussion with others. For any given initial distribution of choices among the agents, applying repeatedly
the update leads to a homogenization of opinions with one of the two competing opinion getting shared by more and
more agents. After some number of updates, all agents eventually adopt the same opinion.
With respect to entropy, the initial random distribution of opinions yields a non zero value of entropy with some
associated disorder. However, repeated updates decrease the disorder gradually to end up with a totally ordered state
characterized by a zero entropy.
In physical systems, above situation corresponds to a kind of spin system with an initial distribution of up and
down spins connected by interactions at zero temperature. Minimizing the energy leads then to a fully ordered ground
state with all spins either up or down characterized by a zero entropy. A non-zero temperature increases the disorder
with a non zero entropy making the free-energy to be minimized instead of the internal energy.
While the temperature is an essential physical quantity, up to now, it has not been possible to identify a social
equivalent. In parallel, the concept of contrarian agents, introduced in the modeling of opinion dynamics within the
Galam model [12–16], does create a disorder in opinion dynamics, which share features with temperature effects
[17, 18]. In particular, contrarian agents produces a non zero entropy making attractors to stabilize mixtures of
opinions with fixed proportions of them [19, 20]. The concept of contrarian behavior has generated a great deal of
works among physicists [21–28] within the active field of scoiophysics [29–33].
The contrarian feature is defined as an additional feature to “normal” behavior of agents following local majority
rules for updating their respective opinions once they are discussing in small groups. Contrary to the normal agent,
the contrarian behaves in two successive steps. First, it acts as a normal agent by expressing its choice. Then, once a
majority has crystallized within the discussing group, while all normal agents adopt it, the contrarian chooses adopting
the opposite one. It may be preserving its initial opinions.
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Configuration Update Weight Probability
A A A→ A A A 1 p3
A A B, A B A, B A A→ A A A 1 3p2(1 − p)
A B B, B A B, B B A→ B B B 0 3p(1 − p)2
B B B→ B B B 0 (1 − p)3
Table 1: Configuration lists the various distribution of A and B in a group of size r = 3 for a population with a proportion p in favor of A and
(1 − p) in favor of B. Update shows the outcome of opinions once majority rule has been applied. Weight gives the corresponding contribution to
opinion A. Probability gives the configuration probability.
The contrarian shift is independent of either choice being majority. It is also worth to notice that activation of
the contrarian behavior is probabilistic. Given an agent in an updating group, it behaves normally with a probability
(1 − c) and turns contrarian with probability c. Accordingly the same agent may behave normally during an update
and be a contrarian during another update. However at every sequence of simultaneous updates, a proportion c of all
agents are contrarians while the complementary proportion (1 − c) behaves normally.
In this paper, we extend the concept of contrarian by investigating the effects of making contrarian behavior
asymmetric. Instead of one proportion c of contrarians, we considers two different proportions x and y to denote the
respective proportions of A and B contrarians [34].
This hypothesis implies that the contrarian feature is now related to the choice itself rather than to the agent
independently of its current holding choice. It worth to emphasize that asymmetric contrarian behavior departs from
physics where asymmetric temperature does not exist. At least, it has not been defined yet.
Our main result is that any non zero value of | x − y | destroys the hung outcome with the attractor being shifted
apart from the fifty-fifty simultaneously restoring a winner over a loser. The corresponding wining strategy is now to
have a bit less contrarians on its side than on the other side.
In addition, contrarian asymmetry splits the contrarian activation between two different schemes. Implementing
the contrarian shift within the update groups or after the updates before reshuffling yields different outcomes, contrary
to the symmetric case where both outcomes are identical.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next Section review the effect of symmetric contrarians using
the Galam model of opinion dynamics. Section 3 introduces asymmetric contrarians with 4 different schemes to
activate the contrarian behavior. These schemes are respectively (i) post-update local asymmetric contrarians; (ii)
post-update global asymmetric contrarians; (iii) in-group asymmetric contrarians with majority/minority contrarians;
(iv) in-group asymmetric contrarians with in-group majority contrarians. The four different updates equations are
discussed in Section 4 while last Section concludes the paper.
2. Symmetric contrarians
2.1. The core model
The contrarian effect has been introduced using the core Galam model of opinion dynamics. Two opinions A and
B are competing within a population of agents denoted floaters. A floater does hold an opinion it has chosen. When a
public debate is launched, a floater tries to convince other agents to adopt its own choice. However a floater agent does
listen to the arguments supporting the other choice and may be convinced to shift its initial choice. The complicated
and complex process of individual making opinion is mimicked by using a local majority rule with every discussing
agent having one vote in favor of either one of the two choices.
The underlying dynamic of opinion deploys in threes steps. First, agents are randomly distributed in local groups
of size r. Then, a local majority rule is applied locally within each group to update individual opinions. It makes each
group ending up unanimous in supporting either A or B. In the third step, agents are reshuffled before going back to
step 1. Each series of the three steps produces a variation of support for both opinions. Starting from some initial
proportions, p0 and (1 − p0) for respectively A and B, the dynamics yields with p0 → p1 → p2 → . . . .
The updating is iterated till an attractor of the dynamics is reached with p0 → p1 → · · · → pn → pn+1 ≈ pn.
Defining the local majority function P(p) allows identifying the associated dynamics by solving the fixed points
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Contrarians Configuration Post-update Weight Probability
0 A A A→ A A A 1 (1 − c)3
1 Ac A A (×3)→ B A A 23 3c(1 − c)2
2 Ac Ac A (×3)→ B B A 13 3c2(1 − c)
3 Ac Ac Ac → B B B 0 c3
0 B B B→ B B B 0 (1 − c)3
1 Bc B B (×3)→ A B B 13 3c(1 − c)2
2 Bc Bc B (×3)→ A A B 23 3c2(1 − c)
3 Bc Bc Bc → A A A 1 c3
Table 2: Distribution of 0, 1, 2, 3 contrarians in configuration A A A once the update has been completed. The associate weight contribution to A
and the probability of occurrence are given.
Equation,
P(p) = p, (1)
which yields the attractors pA, pB and tipping point pt driving the dynamics. Above pt (p0 > pt) the support for A
increases with p0 < p1 < p2 < . . . pn ≈ pA, while below pt (p0 < pt) the support decreases as p0 > p1 > p2 > . . . pn ≈
pB.
However, in real situations, the vote takes place at some update l before reaching the attractor. The dynamics may
also stop by itself with people shifting to discuss another issue after some number m of updates.
In case of groups of size r = 3, 8 local configurations are obtained as exhibited inTable (1). The respective
probability of occurrence, the corresponding local majority updates and the resulting weight contributing to opinion
A are also given. The resulting proportion pt+1 at t + 1 is,
pt+1 ≡ P(pt) = p3t + 3p2t (1 − pt) = −2p3t + 3p2t , (2)
where pt is the A proportion at t. The associated proportion for B is (1 − pt+1) with 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1.
From Eq. (1) two attractors are pA = 1 and pB = 0 separated by a tipping point pt = 12 . Therefore the dynamics
makes the initial majority to win the debate.
2.2. Adding contrarian behavior
Including the psychological feature of contrarian behavior among floaters can have substantial effects on the
dynamics [17]. A contrarian departs from a floater by shifting its opinion to oppose the local majority once it has
revealed itself. The contrarian shift is independent of the majority opinion being either A or B. A contrarian behavior
is activated randomly with some probability c, which accounts for the proportion of contrarian behavior within a social
group. Contrarian behavior may be constant for some agents and temporary for others. However, at any given time, a
proportion c of floaters are contrarian.
The value c is a given fixed external parameter, which is independent of the dynamics and satisfies 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
Most real cases have c < 12 with c >
1
2 producing a systematically collective flips.
For size r = 3, incorporating contrarian shifts once the local majority has been implemented, results in applying
contrarian shifts on unanimous configurations A A A and B B B. Since contrarian shift is probabilistic, 0, 1, 2, 3
contrarians may be present in configurations A A A and B B B. Table (2) shows the various cases with the new
configurations, the weight contributions to opinion A and the respective probabilities of occurrence, which are (1 −
c)3, 3c(1 − c)2, 3c2(1 − c), c3.
From Table (2) Equation (2) becomes,
Pc(p) = CAAAP(p) + CBBB[1 − P(p)], (3)
with
CAAA = (1 − c)3 + 233c(1 − c)
2 +
1
3
3c2(1 − c)
= (1 − c), (4)
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Figure 1: Variations of pA (left) and pB (right) as a function of c are shown. The two attractors exist only in the range 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
and
CBBB =
1
3
3c(1 − c)2 + 2
3
3c2(1 − c) + c3
= c. (5)
Using Equations (4, 5), the update Equation (3) writes as,
Pc(p) = (1 − c)
[
p3 + 3p2(1 − p)
]
+ c
[
3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3
]
, (6)
which shows that activation of contrarians could be also applied identically to individual agents out of the update
groups. Equation (6) simplifies to,
Pc(p) = (1 − 2c)
[
− 2p3t + 3p2t
]
+ c, (7)
which yields two attractors pA, pB and a tipping point pt defined as,
pA =
(1 − 2c) + √1 − 8c + 12c2
2(1 − 2c) ,
pB =
(1 − 2c) − √1 − 8c + 12c2
2(1 − 2c) ,
pt =
1
2
, (8)
provided 0 ≤ c ≤ 16 ≈ 0.1667 and 12 ≤ c ≤ 1 to ensure the existence of the square root.
However for 12 < c < 1 we have pA > 1 and pB < 0 making them non physical. At c=
1
6 and c =
1
2 , pA = pB =
1
2 .
Variations of pA and pB as a function of c are shown in Figure (1). Indeed, for c ≥ 16 , pA and pB merge at the tipping
point pt = 12 turning it to the unique attractor of the dynamics. The two regimes are shown in Figures (2, 3) with
c = 0.08→ pA = 0.11, pB = 0.89, pt = 0.50 and c = 0.20→ pA = pB = pt = 0.50. For the full range c > 16 any initial
value p0 ends up at 12 . For c =
1
2 we have pt+1 =
1
2 for whatever value of pt.
The different regimes of opinion dynamics driven by a non zero proportion of contrarian behavior are exhibited in
the series of Figures (2, 3, 4).
3. Making contrarians asymmetric
Above symmetric contrarian behavior could be connected to the assumption that contrarianism is an individual
feature produced by some social environment. It is individuals a psychological feature to oppose the surrounding
leading opinion. It is therefore independent of opinions themselves, which justifies making contrarian behavior sym-
metrical with respect to A and B [17].
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Figure 2: Using Eq.(7) the expression pt+1 is shown as a function of pt for c = 0 (left) and c = 0.08 (right). The arrows show the dynamics from
p0 = 0.4 for several iterations. Associated attractors are pA = 0, pB = 1, pt = 0.50 for the first case and pA = 0.11, pB = 0.89, pt = 0.50 for the
second case.
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Figure 3: Using Eq.(7) the expression pt+1 is shown as a function of pt for c = 0.2 (left) and c = 0.5 (right). The arrows show the dynamics from
p0 = 0.1 (left) for several iterations. For the second case, any initial value p0 leads to the single attractor within one iteration. For both cases one
single attractor pA = pB = pt = 0.50 drives the dynamics.
c  0.75 , p0  0.2
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pt
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pt+1
c  0.9 , p0  0.35
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pt
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pt+1
Figure 4: As soon as c > 0.5 the dynamics becomes alternating. Using Eq.(7) the expression pt+1 is shown as a function of pt for c = 0.75 (left)
and c = 0.9 (right). The arrows show the dynamics from p0 = 0.1 (left) and p0 = 0.35 (right) for several iterations. For the first case, any initial
value p0 leads to the single attractor pA = pB = pt = 0.50 but through jumps in respective supports for both opinions. For the second case, the
iteration produces jumps around the tipping point pt = 0.50 but now alternating towards pA = 0.15 and pB = 0.85.
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Figure 5: Using Eq. (9) the expression pt+1 as a function of pt is shown for x = 0.08, y = 0.10 (upper curve) and x = 0.20, y = 0.22 (lower curve).
The associated fixed points are respectively pA = 0.15, pt = 0.46, pB = 0.89 and pA = pt = pB = 0.57.
However, contrarianism could be also identified as arising from the cultural content in which a given opinion is
rooted. Behind an opinion choice about a given issue would stand a global frame of thinking. In this case, contrarian-
ism could become asymmetric, some social frames favoring more than others, an individual inclination to challenge
the leading opinion adopting the minority view. Denoting x the probability that an A holding contrarian flips to B and
y the probability that a B holding contrarian flips to A, we study the effect of such an asymmetry on the associated
dynamics of opinion.
It is worth to notice that with symmetrical contrarians, the activation of contrarian shift was found identical when
applied within the update groups or after the updates during the reshuffling prior to a new update. However, with
asymmetric contrarians, while the equivalence is still valid for unanimity configurations A A A and B B B, it does not
hold for configurations A A B and A B B.
Having x , y makes simple analytical solving not possible to determine the values of the various attractors and
tipping points as when x = y. However, it will be seen that the two regimes associated with symmetric contrarians,
one with two attractors and a tipping poing and another one with a single attractor, are still prevailing but with the loss
of symmetry for the location of attractors and tipping points.
Accordingly, in the following of the paper, to keep the presentation clear, both regimes of the dynamics will
be illustrated choosing specific set of values for x and y, which exhibit the main shape of the corresponding phase
diagram.
3.1. Post-update local asymmetric contrarians
When contrarians are activated after the update, Equation (6) is modified as,
P1x,y(p) = (1 − x)
[
p3 + 3p2(1 − p)
]
+ y
[
3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3
]
, (9)
which shows that x , y main effect is twofold removing the hung election scenario (single attractor at fifty/fifty)
yielded by Eq. (8) and turning the dynamics unbalanced. The shift of pA (pB) towards pt becomes faster than the shift
of pB (pA) when x > y (x < y) since now pt is also moving departing from 12 to lower (higher) values.
For instance in the case x = 0.08 and y = 0.10, Eq. (9) yields pA = 0.15, pt = 0.46, pB = 0.89. The coalescence
phenomena observed with symmetrical contrarians is still valid but now it occurs at a value different from 12 as seen
from the case x = 0.20, y = 0.22 yielding pA = pt = pB = 0.57. These two cases are exhibited in Figure (5).
3.2. Post-update global asymmetric contrarians
A variant of post-update contrarians has been studied in the symmetrical case considering the majority status of
an opinion at the global level instead of the local one [35]. Namely, a contrarian flip from A to B takes place with
probability c only when p > 12 and from B to A with the same probability c only when p <
1
2 . In this case, a chaotic
behavior is found around an attractor at fifty/fifty.
Within this global scheme, considering asymmetric contrarians makes a contrarian flip from A to B to occur with
probability x only p > 12 . When p <
1
2 contrarian flips occur only from B to A with probability y. The associated
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Figure 6: Using Eq. (11) the expression pt+1 as a function of pt is shown for x = 0.20, y = 0.18 (upper curve). The associated evolution from
p0 = 0.26 is exhibited (lower curve). The attractor pt = 12 has split in two limiting points located at p
a
t = 0.4 and p
b
t = 0.59.
Contrarians Configuration In-group majority/minority Weight Proba
0 A A B→ A A A 1 (1 − x)2(1 − y)
1 Ac A B→ B A A 23 2x(1 − x)(1 − y)
1 A A Bc → A A B 23 (1 − x)2y
2 Ac Ac B→ B B A 13 x2(1 − y)
2 Ac A Bc → B A B 13 2x(1 − x)y
3 Ac Ac Bc → B B B 0 x2y
Table 3: Distribution of 0, 1, 2, 3 contrarians within a configuration A A B. Associated updates are shown with the weight contribution to A and
the probability of occurrence.
update Equation writes as,
p >
1
2
→ P2ax (p) = (1 − x)
[
p3 + 3p2(1 − p)
]
,
p <
1
2
→ P2by ((p) = p3 + 3p2(1 − p) + y
[
(1 − p)3 + 3p(1 − p)2
]
, (10)
which still produces a chaotic behavior but now at a value of pt , 12 instead of pt =
1
2 .
Figure (6) illustrates the behavior from Eq. (11) for the case x = 0.20, y = 0.18. The attractor pt = 12 has split in
two limiting points located at pat = 0.4 and p
b
t = 0.59.
3.3. In-group asymmetric contrarians
Activation of contrarians inside the update group opens two different possible schemes since A and B agents are
not in the same situation as seen with the case A A Bc (Ac B B). First scheme considers that Bc (Ac ) being already
minority against A (B), keeps the same opinion B (A). On the other hand, the second scheme considers that Bc (Ac
) being minority, its contrarian feature is not activated and thus the agent follows the local majority turning A (B).
However, for configurations A A A and B B B, there is no change with respect to the post-update scheme.
3.3.1. In-group majority/minority contrarians
First scheme was investigated in [34] with for instance the update A A Bc → A A B. All configuration updates
with independent contrarians are listed in Table (3) for groups of size 3 for the configuration A A B with 0, 1, 2, 3
contrarians.
The update Equation (2) writes now,
P3x,y(p) = CAAA(x)p
3 + CAAB(x, y)3p2(1 − p)
+ CBBB(y)(1 − p)3 + CABB(x, y)3p(1 − p)2, (11)
7
x = 0.08, y = 0.10
Diagonal
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pt
p t
+1
x = 0.20, y = 0.22
Diagonal
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pt
p t
+1
Figure 7: Using Eq. (16) the expression pt+1 as a function of pt is shown for x = 0.08, y = 0.10 (upper curve) and x = 0.20, y = 0.22 (lower curve).
The associated fixed points are respectively pA = 0.14, pt = 0.48, pB = 0.89 and pA = pt = pB = 0.54.
with from Table (2),
CAAA(x) = (1 − x)3 + 2x(1 − x)2 + x2(1 − x) + 0x3
= (1 − x), (12)
and from Table (3),
CAAB(x, y) = (1 − x)2(1 − y)
+
4
3
x(1 − x)(1 − y) + 2
3
(1 − x)2y
+
1
3
x2(1 − y) + 2
3
x(1 − x)y
= 1 − 2
3
x − 1
3
y , (13)
By symmetry we get
CBBB(y) = y (14)
and
CBBA(x, y) =
2
3
y +
1
3
x, (15)
to yield,
P3x,y(p) = (1 − x)p3 + y(1 − p)3
+
[
1 − 2
3
x − 1
3
y)
]
3p2(1 − p)
+
[2
3
y +
1
3
x
]
3p(1 − p)2 , (16)
which writes,
P3x,x(p) = (1 − x)
[
p3 + 3p2(1 − p)
]
+ x
[
(1 − p)3 + 3p(1 − p)2
]
, (17)
when x = y thus recovering Eq. (6) with x = c.
For x = 0.08 and y = 0.10, Eq. (16) yields pA = 0.14, pt = 0.48, pB = 0.89. The coalescence phenomena
observed with symmetrical contrarians is still valid but now it occurs at a value different from 12 as seen from the case
x = 0.20, y = 0.22 yielding pA = pt = pB = 0.54. These two cases are exhibited in Figure (7).
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Contrarians Configuration In-group majority/minority Weight Proba
0 A A B→ A A A 1 (1 − x)2(1 − y)
1 Ac A B→ B A A 23 2x(1 − x)(1 − y)
1 A A Bc → A A A 1 (1 − x)2y
2 Ac Ac B→ B B A 13 x2(1 − y)
2 Ac A Bc → B A A 23 2x(1 − x)y
3 Ac Ac Bc → B B A 13 x2y
Table 4: Distribution of 0, 1, 2 contrarians within a configuration A A B. Associated updates are shown with the weight contribution to A and the
probability of occurrence.
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Figure 8: Using Eq. (20) the expression pt+1 as a function of pt is shown for x = 0.08, y = 0.10 (upper curve) and x = 0.20, y = 0.22 (lower curve).
The associated fixed points are respectively pA = 0.13, pt = 0.47, pB = 0.90 and pA = pt = pB = 0.64.
3.3.2. In-group majority contrarians
While above, contrarians are always activated within the update group, we could consider that contrarianism is
activated at a contrarian agent only when this agent finds itself in an initial local majority in a group. In this case, a
contrarian Bc (Ac) in a group A A Bc (B B Ac) keeps dormant and acts as a regular floater following the local majority
rule. According to this scheme A A Bc (B B Ac)→ A A A (B B B) instead of A A B (B B A) above. Table (3) is thus
modified as shown in Table (4). Accordingly, Eq. (13) becomes,
CAAB(x, y) = (1 − x)2(1 − y)
+
4
3
x(1 − x)(1 − y) + (1 − x)2y
+
1
3
x2(1 − y) + 4
3
x(1 − x)y + 1
3
x2y
= 1 − 2
3
x , (18)
and by symmetry Eq. (15) becomes,
CBBA(x, y) =
2
3
y, (19)
to yield,
P4x,y(p) = (1 − x)p3 + y(1 − p)3
+
[
1 − 2
3
x)
]
3p2(1 − p)
+
[2
3
y
]
3p(1 − p)2 . (20)
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Configuration A A A A A B A B B B B B
Probability p3 3p2(1 − p) 3p(1 − p)2 (1 − p)3
1 post-update local majority (1 − x) (1 − x) y y
2a post-update global majority p > 12 (1 − x) (1 − x) 0 0
2b post-update global majority p < 12 1 1 y y
3 In-groups local majority/minority (1 − x) (1 − 23 x − 13 y) ( 23 y + 13 x) y
4 In-groups local majority (1 − x) (1 − 23 x) 23 y y
Table 5: Rescaling factors for the probability of occurrence of configurations A A A, A A B, A B B, B B B for the various contrarian schemes.
For x = 0.08 and y = 0.10, Eq. (20) yields pA = 0.13, pt = 0.47, pB = 0.90. The coalescence phenomena
observed with symmetrical contrarians is still valid but now it occurs at a value different from 12 as seen from the case
x = 0.20, y = 0.22 yielding pA = pt = pB = 0.64. These two cases are exhibited in Figure (8).
4. Discussion
Asymmetric contrarians were shown to generate four different schemes to account for the effect on the associated
opinion dynamics. For update groups of size three, the various components to the update equations are listed in Table
(5). Combined together, the respective update equations are,
P1x,y(p) = (1 − x)
[
p3 + 3p2(1 − p)
]
+ y
[
3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3
]
,
P2ax, (p) = (1 − x)
[
p3 + 3p2(1 − p)
]
⇐ p > 1
2
,
P2by (p) = p
3 + 3p2(1 − p) + y
[
3p(1 − p)2 + (1 − p)3
]
⇐ p < 1
2
,
P3x,y(p) = (1 − x)p3 +
[
1 − 2
3
x − 1
3
y)
]
3p2(1 − p)
+
[2
3
y +
1
3
x
]
3p(1 − p)2 + y(1 − p)3 ,
P4x,y(p) = (1 − x)p3 +
[
1 − 2
3
x)
]
3p2(1 − p)
+
[2
3
y
]
3p(1 − p)2 + y(1 − p)3. (21)
The common feature of four schemes is the breaking of the dynamics symmetry. In particular, the fifty-fifty
attractor is shifted to a value different from fifty-fifty yielding a majority and a minority. Comparing schemes 1, 3 and
4 shows some minor quantitative differences while scheme 4 is rather different as expected since it is connected to the
global majority.
It is worth to notice that while P1x,x(p) = P
3
x,x(p) , P
4
x,x(p) since indeed scheme 4 activates contrarian behavior
only when an agent is at minority within an updating group before the update is completed.
To illustrate the differences between the various schemes 1, 3 and 4, we show several cases of variations of the
associated fixed points as a function of x for a fixed value of y. Figure (9) compares schemes 1 and 3 and 1 and 4
for y = 0.12. Figure (10) compares schemes 1, 3 and 4 for y = 0 and y = 0.10 while Figure (11) does the same for
y = 0.12 and y = 0.21.
Left part of Figure (9) and right part of Figure (10) show that for scheme 3 the attractor pB increases slightly its
value with increasing x, which looks paradoxical since contrarians are expected to decrease the overall support of their
corresponding opinion. Indeed, scheme 3 maintains a contrarian being in a minority position to keep on its opinion.
It implies that when support for A (B) is low, many configurations have A (B) in minority and thus preserves A (B)
opinion. More A (B) contrarians for low p thus increases slightly the support for A (B).
Figure (12) provides an illustration of this paradox exhibiting the balance between the loss and gain from contrarian
behavior as a function of p, from configurations A A B and A B B for schemes 3 (right) and 4 (left). The cases
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Figure 9: Fixed points of scheme 1 and 3 (left) and schemes 1 and 4 (right) as a function of x for y = 0.12. The two dotted vertical lines show the
area with a tipping point between two attractors. Outside the lines, the dynamics is driven by one single attractor.
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Figure 10: Fixed points of schemes 1 and 3 and 4 as a function of x for y = 0 (left) and y = 0.10 (right).
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Figure 11: Fixed points of schemes 1 and 3 and 4 as a function of x for y = 0.12 (left) and y = 0.21 (right).
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Figure 12: Net balance between gain minus loss from contrarian behavior for scheme 4 and 3 when x = 0 and y = 0.10 (left) and x = 0.12 and
y = 0.10 (right). More A contrarians for low values of p increases the net gain for A.
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Figure 13: Amplitude of the negative contribution − 23 x3p2(1 − p) (Loss) from A contrarians (proportion x) and the amplitude of the positive
contribution 13 x3p(1 − p)2 (Gain) for x = 0.20. The positive contribution is seen to be bigger than the negative one for p < 13 .
x = 0, y = 0.10 and x = 0, 12, y = 0.10 are compared. It is seen that increasing x reduces the net balance at low p for
scheme 4 as expected. However, the opposite occurs for scheme 3.
Indeed, looking at the 4 schemes associated with the update equations listed in Eq. (21) , it is seen that only P3x,y(p)
has a positive x contribution from the minority configurations A B B, which explains the counterintuitive finding that
at low values of p, increasing x increases a bit the A support. Figures (12,13)) shows both the amplitude of the
negative contribution − 23 x3p2(1 − p) from A contrarians (proportion x) and the amplitude of the positive contribution
1
3 x3p(1 − p)2 for x = 0.20. The positive contribution is seen to be bigger than the negative one for p < 13 .
5. Conclusion
We have introduces asymmetry in contrarian behavior with respect to two competing opinions A and B to account
for inhomogeneity in the distribution of psychological traits within a given population in connexion to the ability to
differ from the group. It hints at contrarian behavior being connected to the underlying cultural frame of social groups.
Accordingly, symmetric contrarians are expected to prevail within homogeneous populations.
Asymmetry was shown to generate several different schemes for the contrarian activation. A rich variety of
changes has been found about the values of the attractors and tipping point [36].
However, the differences by themselves are not of large amplitude establishing the robustness of contrarian behav-
ior. Nevertheless, it is worth to emphasize that as soon as asymmetry is turned on, the salient feature of having a single
attractor located precisely at fifty-fifty is waived off. However, now a slightly lower proportion of contrarian on its
own side than on the other competing side is the key to eventually win a public debate, whin in turn can transform into
an election victory. This result allows to envision novel wining strategies focusing on the lowering of the proportion
of contrarians on its own side.
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